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IIMMY'S TALE OF RUSSIAN DECEIT

Jimmy Carter's hot-line exchange with Leonid Brezhnev over Afghanistan was not his first personal encounter with Soviet duplicity. In the summer of 1978, Carter told White House visitors about an experience with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who had come to the Oval Office to discuss the pending SALT II negotiations. Sitting on Carter's desk at that moment was an intelligence report so detailed—and accurate that it not only supplied chapter and verse on Soviet involvement in Ethiopia's war against the Somalis, but named a Russian general who had been taken ill in Africa and rushed back to Moscow. Carter repeated the incriminating data to Gromyko, who listened stoically and replied in effect: "Mr. President, what general? What troops? We have no troops in Ethiopia." Telling the story to his guests, Carter ended by saying: "And that man sat there and lied to me. He lied to my face. I just can't imagine an American diplomat doing that sort of thing."

Another intelligence failure?

As in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution that toppled the Shah, Washington is disturbed by the apparent inadequacy of U.S. intelligence on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are conducting a quiet postmortem to find out why they missed a massive mobilization of Russian forces. Almost up to the moment of the invasion, U.S. analysts reported only 15,000 Soviet troops in position for a possible move across the Afghan border. Yet 50,000 troops took part in the invasion. Several thousand were transported from Baltic bases in Western Russia to Central Asia, and the movement of those troops either escaped U.S. detection or failed to cause any alarm.